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ABSTRACT
In the 1830s, when whaling was a prosperous American industry, a number of whaling corporations
were chartered. All of them were short-lived. This paper analyzes the failure of corporations in
American whaling, and argues that the corporate form was unable to create the incentives requisite
for success in the industry. Most nineteenth-century whaling ventures were owned by a small
number of local investors, and were configured to provide powerful incentives for their managers.
The effect of the corporate form on productivity is analyzed using a newly-collected panel dataset
of 874 whaling voyages. Many whaling corporations were managed by individuals who had
previously (or would subsequently) manage ventures with the usual ownership structure. Using an







ehilt@wellesley.eduConsider the problems faced by a prospective investor in a nineteenth-century whaling
venture. The business would be managed by an “agent,” a managing partner, who would
purchase supplies and hire a captain and crew, and plan the voyage on behalf of the in-
vestors.1 The agent’s performance may have been diﬃcult for the investor to evaluate,
or even observe. Then the vessel was entrusted to the captain and crew and sent on a
voyage to seas tens of thousands of miles away for periods of three years or longer, often
circumnavigating the earth in the process. The actions of the crew would have been nearly
impossible to observe while the voyage was underway, as would the eﬀorts of the agent hire
a good captain, and supervise the voyage. Incentive problems arise in the ﬁnancing of any
business, but in whaling these problems were particularly acute.
The contracts and organizational forms employed in whaling in the nineteenth century
evolved in response to these problems. Most American whaling enterprises were closely held
by a small number of local investors, and the allocation of ownership rights within these
ventures was conﬁgured to provide powerful incentives for their managers. The industry’s
agents usually held substantial ownership shares in their ventures, thus aligning their in-
terests with those of the other investors. Organized as unincorporated partnerships, these
enterprises dominated the industry from its inception in the seventeenth century, through
its decline in the late nineteenth century.
In the 1830s, a new mode of organization was introduced into the industry: the corpo-
ration. These whaling corporations were created at a time when the use of incorporation
began contribute to the development of many nineteenth century industries.2 Indeed, some
have argued that the growth of corporations was “the most important and conspicuous
feature of the development of society in Europe and America.”3 These early whaling cor-
porations attempted to create diﬀusely-owned enterprises, governed by a formal structure
including a board of directors and a committee of executive oﬃcers. This represented a
signiﬁcant departure from the traditional reliance on concentrated ownership to resolve in-
centive conﬂicts in the industry, and it failed: none of the whaling corporations survived
1A full account of the responsibilities of whaling agents is presented in Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997).
2The evolution of the use of the corporation as an organizational form in the late ninteenth and early
twentieth century is documented by Kim (2003), Lamoreaux (2003), and Atack and Bateman (1995).
3Davis (1905), p. 1.
1beyond the 1840s, and few experienced much ﬁnancial success, at a time the American
whaling industry as a whole continued to expand.
This paper will analyze the failure of corporations in the American whaling industry.
The whaling corporations of the 1830s and 1840s did not alter the production process
used by unincorporated ventures—they paid their crews using the same incentive contracts
known as “lays,” they used similar vessels, and their day-to-day operations were managed
by an agent with the same responsibilities.4 They diﬀered from other whaling enterprises
mainly in their ownership structures and their hierarchical form of governance. Although
these features oﬀered many potential advantages to small investors, they were unable to
create the incentives requisite for success in the industry. The managers of these corpo-
rations, who did not hold signiﬁcant ownership stakes, did not perform as well as their
peers in unincorporated ventures, and as a result, the enterprises “failed to yield the proﬁt
anticipated,” and were abandoned.5
The American whaling industry presents an ideal setting in which to analyze the eﬀects
of organizational forms on productivity in the development of the American economy. The
entrepreneurs of the business—the agents—often managed dozens voyages over their careers,
each of which can be regarded as separate business units, and many of which might have
had diﬀerent investors. The customs records that were created for each voyage contain
detailed information not typically available for early-nineteenth-century ﬁrms, and present
a unique opportunity to follow the diﬀerent ventures of entrepreneurs over time.
This paper endeavors to exploit these features of the whaling industry and its surviving
records through the analysis of a newly-constructed panel of 874 whaling voyages from 22
diﬀerent ports, managed by 106 diﬀerent agents. Many whaling corporations were founded
and managed by entrepreneurs who had previously managed (or would subsequently man-
age) unincorporated partnerships with the usual ownership structure. The dataset contains
a number of whaling voyages managed by these entrepreneurs, and the eﬀect of incorpora-
4Because they did not modify the production process, but merely imposed a diﬀerent governance structure
on the same production process employed by other enterprises, these corporations did not diﬀer from their
unincorporated counterparts in the extent to which they faced the tradeoﬀs associated with joint production,
as assumed, for example, in Allen and Lueck (1998). The “lay” system of incentive compensation contracts
is analyzed in Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997), and Hohman (1928).
5Ruttenber (1875), referring to the Newburgh Whaling Co. of Newburgh, NY.
2tion can thus be identiﬁed in an individual-ﬁxed-eﬀects framework from these observations.
The entrepreneurs who formed whaling corporations were certainly a self-selected group,
located in ports with little whaling activity (in a business dominated by a few large ports
that specialized in whaling), and may have lacked the talents or experience requisite for
success. However, the estimated results indicate a robust negative eﬀect on productivity in
the entrepreneurs’ incorporated enterprises, compared to their unincorporated partnerships.
Thus, even if only a self-selected group of unsuccessful entrepreneurs formed corporations,
their corporate ventures were even less successful.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the evolution of the organizational
forms of whaling enterprises is examined, with a particular focus on the role of the provision
of incentives, and the allocation of rights of control. The history is followed through the
many phases of the industry’s development, into the 1830s, when whaling corporations were
formed. The section that follows—Section 2—a presents a discussion of the experience of
whaling corporations, and an analysis of their governance structures. Section 3 suggests
some explanations for the failure of these corporations, and Section 4 presents an empirical
analysis of the performance of whaling corporations. Section 5 discusses the results and
concludes the paper.
The contracts between the investors and managers of whaling ventures in the nineteenth
century evolved from earlier schemes used in 18th century whaling voyages, which, in turn,
had evolved from contracts used in the much earlier shore whaling industry. The next section
presents a brief description of the evolution of the contracts employed in the industry.
1 History of Whaling Enterprises and their Organization
In the earliest British settlements in Massachusetts and on Long Island, the commercial
exploitation of whales commenced almost immediately upon the colonists’ arrival. A small
number of merchants usually owned the capital employed by the “companies” of men who
were based on shore, and pursued whales in small craft. Rather than owning a stake in a
formally-organized ﬁrm, these “adventurers uppon the whale designe” might each have con-
tributed some of the goods and supplies involved in whaling, and received a commensurate
3share of the proceeds.6 In general, the crews were paid in shares of the oil they produced,
with the owners of the vessel and equipment receiving the balance; usually the crew and
the owners each received half. The shares paid to the diﬀerent sailors appear to have been
equal; each member of a six-person crew would have received a “sixthe part of a halfe ﬁsh.”7
The shore whaling companies on Long Island and in Massachusetts all seem to have used
this arrangement, with a “half share” paid to the crews, and the balance retained by the
owners.8
In order to pursue larger, more distant populations of whales, the passive shore-based
approach was gradually supplanted by voyages in larger craft capable of travelling greater
distances. This early deep-sea whaling, which began in the late seventeenth century, was
carried out in small vessels of around 30 to 50 tons, on voyages lasting a few weeks, with
crews of twelve or thirteen.9 The companies would hunt whales from the decks of these
vessels, or, in the case of the larger schooners, might carry small whaleboats on board,
which would be launched when whales were spotted. These “oﬀshore” whalers pursued
populations of right whales that roamed farther out at sea, a transition that was accelerated
as local whale populations began to decline due to the predations of the industry.10 But
they also began to pursue another species of whale that remained far oﬀshore, unreachable
to the shore whaling companies: the sperm whale.11
Whaling enterprises evolved along with whaling techniques. Deep-sea whaling required
a greater amount of capital, both in the form of the larger vessel, and in the supplies and
equipment necessary for the larger crews on their longer voyages. A precise description of
6Records of the Town of East Hampton, December 2 1675.
7Records of the Town of East Hampton, June 1675 (vol. 1, p. 376). See also contracts entered July 4,
1675; December 2, 1675; December 27, 1677; and March 13, 1678. Similar contracts are found in the Records
of the Town of Southampton, in April 7, 1675; January 30, 1677; and January 20, 1676.
8Some of the owners may have also held indentures of men, usually Indians, who were employed as sailors
in the company. See, for example, Records of the Town of East Hampton, March 13, 1678. Vickers (1983)
describes the importance of indentured Indian labor, and the use of debt peonage, in the whaling industry on
Nantucket. There is some evidence that enslaved Africans were also employed in whaling in the eighteenth
century; see Palmer (1959).
9The tonnage ﬁgures are from Starbuck (1878, p. 22). See also Macy (1835).
10Right whales are baleen whales, meaning that they have keratinous strands of this substance in their
mouths. The oil produced from their blubber is denoted “whale oil,” in contrast to the oil from sperm
whales.
11The blubber of sperm whales produces an oil of superior quality to (right) whale oil, and is odorless,
whereas even reﬁned right whale oil emits a ﬁshy smell. Moreover, encased in their enormous heads is a
waxy substance, spermaceti (sometimes called “head matter”), which was even more valuable.
4the conﬁguration of whaling enterprises from this era is found in a letter written by Micajah
Coﬃn, a whaling merchant (and former whaling captain) on Nantucket. In response to an
inquiry from a friend in another city, who was considering entering the whaling business,
about the organization of a whaling voyage, Coﬃn wrote:
In the ﬁrst place, a whale voyage is performed with Thirteen men which forms
the said voyage into thirteen shares because we have our men on shares that all
the men on board may have an interest in the success of said voyage. The master
has for his wages one share of the whole, that is 1
13 of said voyage. The mate
has 1
20 of the voyage, the third man or harpooner has one twentysixth of ditto
the fourth man or harpooner has one Thirtieth of said voyage and nine men
more have half shares of three quarters which in a good voyage is tolerable good
wages; in a poor voyage there is no wages to pay. The vessel Draws for her share
fore ware & tare one fourth of said voyage. The remainder is for them that lay
in the Stores or pay for them (which we call with us adventurers) stores such as
provisions Boats oars whale Irons barrels &c. The charge commonly Expended
with us on a voyage is about one hundred & Eighty ﬁve pounds which voyage is
performed in about six months heretofore but I conceive a voyage to the coast of
Guinea & Brazille will be nine months sailing...Find partners agreeable to own
a vessel of about one hundred; or one hundred ten or twenty Tons...12
The basis for the crew’s pay was a modiﬁed form of the “share” system from the early shore
whaling companies: for a crew of thirteen, the proceeds were divided into thirteen shares.
The letter also indicates that the owners of the vessel received one fourth, as they did in
shore whaling, and the the other investors or “adventurers,” who paid for the supplies and
equipment used in the voyage, received the balance, or around one fourth.13 But because
the productive process now occurred onboard the vessel, rather than taking place partly on
land, the owners of the vessel itself assumed greater control over the enterprise. As maritime
law grants the owners of the vessel the right to control its voyage14, this implied that the
investors who paid for the supplies and equipment of the voyage—the very materials that
would be expended—had no rights of control or, in the language of Grossman and Hart
(1986), residual rights. In exchange for a ﬁxed share of output, the investors paid to ﬁnance
a voyage whose conduct and expenses they could not control.
12Micajah Coﬃn, letter to Capt. Nath. Bacchus, August 13 1773 (Coﬃn, 1773).
13The amount paid to the owners of the vessel, one fourth, seems to be relatively constant among diﬀerent
vessels at the time. See Vickers (1983).
14See Blunt’s (1829) discussion of the rights of vessel owners (ch. 8).
5Conﬂicts between the investors and the vessel owners under this arrangement were in-
evitable. In a 1769 printed broadside, Boston merchants who had ﬁnanced whaling voyages
listed quantities of supplies they agreed were necessary for a whaling voyage, and wrote:
Inasmuch as it is found from several Years Experience in the Whale-Fishery,
that the Method of ﬁxing out for that Business has been unequal, and much to
the Prejudice of the Fixers: Wherefore, in Order to put the same upon a more
just and equal footing in the future, We the Subscribers do agree to grant...such
Stores...as is speciﬁed above, and no more.15
Unless the vessel owners granted rights to the investors, these outsiders did not have a legal
basis to inﬂuence the conduct of the voyage, or, for example, to recall their equipment if
they felt it was improperly used.
In the late eighteenth and early ninteenth centuries, American whaling vessels began to
venture into more distant oceans, on ever longer voyages.16 The size of the vessels employed
increased, and reached an average of more than 300 tons; the size of the crews increased
with the vessels, growing from around thirteen in the 1770s to around 30 after 1815; and the
length of voyages increased to around two years by 1815.17 These voyages required much
larger investments in vessels and in supplies, and the allocation of rights of control in the
industry’s ﬁnancial contracts evolved in response.18
In particular, the class of investors who ﬁnanced a voyage’s expenses in exchange for
a share of proﬁts, with no rights of control, disappeared. Instead, investors in whaling
voyages purchased ownership shares in the vessels themselves. As co-owners, maritime law
guaranteed them rights of control over the voyage, in proportion to their stake in the vessel.
They were also collectively responsible for the expenses of the voyage, in proportion to their
15Anon., “Articles of Agreement relative to the Whale Fishery,” 10 February 1769, Early American Im-
prints, ﬁrst series, no. 11162. Emphasis in original.
16Starbuck (1878, p. 168) presents a detailed tabulation of American whaling voyages in the eighteenth
century; his tables include statistics for vessel tonnages and voyage lengths. The innovation that facilitated
these longer voyages was the introduction of on-board “tryworks,” the apparatus used to render the oil from
blubber, sometime during the mid-eighteenth century.
17In their sample of New Bedford voyages, Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997) carefully document average
vessel tonnages and lengths of voyages for this period.
18Data on the costs of early whaling voyages are scant, but in the 1770s, the cost of the equipment and
provisions for whaling voyages was generally around £180, and the vessels and rigging cost between £200
and £1000 (Alden, 1774-1816; Rotch, 1771). By the 1830s, By 1835, the cost of the supplies for a voyage
had risen to $18,000, and the cost of a typical 300-ton vessel was $20,000 (Macy, 1835).
6ownership stakes, and, after the crews were paid, received the proﬁts from the voyage. It is
likely that this change in the structure of the contracts used in ﬁnancing whaling voyages
was important in facilitating the larger investments that were made in the industry during
the nineteenth century.
Most whaling vessels of this era therefore had many owners.19 But they were sent on
voyages that were far more complex than their shorter, eighteenth-century predecessors, and
the successful management of these ventures required substantial expertise. In response, the
planning and management of these voyages was delegated to a merchant or merchant ﬁrm,
known as the vessel’s “agent,” who specialized in managing whaling voyages.20 The agent
would handle all of the important decisions for the voyage: he would purchase the supplies;
hire the captain and crew; keep all the vessel’s accounts; give the captain his orders for the
voyage, which included the locations where he was to seek whales; supervise the captain
while the voyage was underway, by corresponding with the captain whenever possible; and
determine the timing of the sale of the vessel’s output. Essentially, the agent served the same
role as the vessel owner in the previous arrangement, except that his co-owners possessed
the same rights of control as he did.
The management of whaling voyages was not governed by any articles of agreement. The
co-owners simply delegated management of the vessels’ day-to-day operations to the agent,
and participated only in the most crucial decisions for the voyage, such as its itinerary over
the oceans. In order to ensure that the agent had strong incentives to act in the owners’
interests, the agent usually retained a substantial ownership share in the vessel, and in some
ports the agents retained, on average, 44% of the equity in their vessels.21 Given the wide
range of responsibilities held by the agent, this was a crucial source of incentives for the
manager to perform fulﬁll his responsibilities diligently.
19In the sample of voyages from the 1830s and 1840s presented below, the average number of owners of
the vessels is around 9.
20This arrangement is similar to the position of managing owner or “ship’s husband” employed in other
maritime trades with jointly-owned vessels.
21Systematic data on the size of ownership shares of agents becomes available on the late 1840s, when this
information was recorded on the vessels’ registers. In Davis, Gallman and Gleiter’s (1997) sample of New
Bedford vessels from 1846-60, the average ownership share of the agents was more than 30%. Hilt (2003)
ﬁnds that in New London during this period, the agent’s retained 44% on average. On the eﬀectiveness of
concentrated ownership in resolving incentive conﬂicts, see for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
7Other complimentary mechanisms were employed to create the necessary incentives for
the agents. The relatively small number of owners, each holding a substantial share in the
vessel, had strong incentives to monitor the agent’s activities. In addition, most of the in-
vestors in whaling voyages lived in the same towns as the agents whose voyages they helped
ﬁnance.22 Personal, and sometimes even familial, relationships between the investors and
the agents probably helped create additional incentives for the agent. Moreover, Davis,
Gallman and Gleiter (1997, chapter 10) document that groups of investors tended to invest
in voyages together, usually with the same agent. Thus the prospect of repeated inter-
action, and in particular, future investments, probably also created an important source
of incentives for the agent, which complemented the incentives arising from his ownership
share.
In the many port cities in which whaling became an important industry in the nine-
teenth century, whaling voyages were owned and managed in this way. This highly successful
mode of organization survived through the late nineteenth century, when the whaling in-
dustry itself became nearly extinct in the United States. The only signiﬁcant deviation
from this model occurred in the 1830s, when a number of whaling ﬁrms were organized as
corporations.
2 Whaling corporations
Although most of the ﬁrms that served as agents for whaling voyages were partnerships,
and thus typical of other New England merchants, the whaling vessels they managed were
separate business entities that were not formal partnerships.23 Whaling vessels resembled
partnerships in some respects, in that the assets of the vessel owners and the assets of the
vessel were not considered legally distinct. As such, the owners of the vessel were personally
liable for whatever debts or legal judgements the vessel incurred. But there were important
features of the shipowning arrangements used in whaling, as well as other maritime trades,
22In a sample of major whaling ports, Hilt (2003) documents that about 75% of vessel owners resided in
the city in which the voyages were managed.
23For a description of partnerships and a discussion of their prominence among early business enterprises,
see Lamoreaux (1995; 1997), Bodenhorn (2000), and Kim (2003).
8that enabled the vessels to enjoy many of the privileges normally reserved for corporations.24
For example, the vessels were treated by their agents as distinct business entities, and
accounts were kept in the vessels’ names. More importantly, whereas partnerships usually
terminated upon the death or withdrawal of a partner, ownership shares in vessels could be
transferred without aﬀecting the vessel.
In the 1830s, a few whaling entrepreneurs—some with experience as agents, and oth-
ers simply wishing to enter the business—applied to their state legislatures for charters of
incorporation. The formation of whaling corporations in the 1830s coincided with a large
increase in incorporations generally, as state legislatures became more willing to grant char-
ters to businesses.25 Initially, they met with some resistance, as legislators were particularly
wary of granting charters to maritime ﬁrms that might eventually develop into monopolistic
entities like those
under the European governments that have been considered an evil, and such
is the British East India Company, such was the South Sea Company, and such
the Dutch East India Company...26
Eventually, however, the charters were granted.27
The content of the charters of whaling corporations in diﬀerent states varied somewhat,
but in general they included: the right to own land, up to some speciﬁed amount; the right
to exist over a speciﬁed period of time; the right to act in law, or to sue and be sued as a
separate entity; a clear governance structure; the right of shareholders to transfer ownership
stakes; and some limitations, in the form of minima and maxima, on the ﬁrm’s capital stock.
Although synonymous with incorporation today, limited liability was not granted to any
24An exploration of shipowning in general is presented in Albion (1941). Boyce (1992) describes similar
institutions in Britain.
25In general, the types of organizations that states were willing to charter evolved slowly after the Rev-
olution, beginning ﬁrst with non-business organizations (churches, libraries, schools, etc.); then businesses
where there was some public interest involved, such as banks, insurance companies, and land companies; and
ﬁnally, railroads and manufacturing companies. Massachusetts, for example, began to charter manufacturing
companies on a wide scale only after 1809. See, for example, Dodd (1954, p. 226). Wallis (2003) documents
the diﬀerences across states in the willingness of governments to grant corporate charters to businesses.
26“Report of the Committee on Trade and Manufactures,on an engrossed bill from the Senate, entitled
‘An Act to Incorporate the North River Whaling company’,” New York Assembly, April 16, 1833. Most
bills to incorporate whaling ﬁrms encountered some resistance of this nature.
27The state legislatures that granted the charters may have charged fees or otherwise extracted revenue
from the incorporators. See Wallis (2003).
9of the whaling corporations of this era.28 The Massachusetts whaling corporations were in
fact required to print an admonishment of unlimited liability on their stock certiﬁcates.
What advantage, then, did the corporate form of ownership oﬀer to whaling entrepreneurs
and investors? Although the right to act in law, and to sue and be sued, would probably
have simpliﬁed interactions with other ﬁrms, there does not seem to have been a pressing
need for this feature of corporate charters.29 Moreover, the owners of unincorporated vessels
possessed at least some limited right to transfer their shares, and the right to exist as an
enterprise so long as the vessel existed, and so did not need to apply for a charter for these
privileges. More likely, it was the formal governance structure (and with it, the carefully
speciﬁed voting rights and disclosure requirements), coupled with the oﬃcial imprimatur
embodied in the corporate charter granted by the state. Compared to the industry’s unin-
corporated ventures, where there were no articles of agreement and no formal procedures
for decisionmaking—most decisions were simply delegated to the agent—these features of-
fered the potential to make an investment in a whaling venture more attractive to small
investors.30
Thus whaling corporations were formed at least in part to create an alternative mode of
organization for the industry’s ﬁrms, that was believed to be attractive to greater numbers of
shareholders. The incorporators envisaged large enterprises, with diﬀuse ownership among
many investors, whose interests would be protected by an elected board of directors. In some
cases, perhaps in an attempt to safeguard the interest of small investors, the corporations
prohibited any investor from owning more than a small number of shares.31 In general,
these ﬁrms were able to attract investments from large numbers of investors.
28See, for example, “An Act to Incorporate the Poughkeepsie Whaling Company,” New York Session
Laws, April 20 1832; and “An Act to Incorporate the Fall River Whaling Company,” Massachusetts General
Court Laws, April 9 1836. Many of the rights and privileges to which corporations were entitled were in
ﬂux in the early nineteenth century, and varied signiﬁcantly between states, and between diﬀerent industries
within states.
29In lawsuits between whaling vessels, the vessels “and owners” were named as litigants. This would pose
a problem only if some of the owners of each vessel were the same; an individual can not be on both sides
of a lawsuit.
30This suggests another possible reason that investors in whaling ventures tended to live in the ports in
which their vessels were based: these individuals probably knew one another, and may have been able to reach
agreement over contentious questions more easily in the absence of a formal structure of decisionmaking.
31In the case of the Portsmouth Whaling Company, no shareholder was permitted to own more than 5
(out of a total of 100) shares. “An Act to Incorporate the Sundry Persons by Name of the Portsmouth
Whaling Company,” Laws of New Hampshire, 22 June 1832.
10As with unincorporated whaling ventures, the investors owned the corporations’ assets,
and possessed rights of control over them. However, the investors in corporations delegated
their rights of control to a substantial extent to a board of directors, and/or an executive
committee of corporate oﬃcers. These directors and oﬃcers would then delegate the man-
agement of the day-to-day operations of the vessels to an individual, who was usually called
the corporation’s agent. It should be noted that the conﬁguration of production within
these corporations was precisely the same as it was in the unincorporated ventures: an
agent would plan and supervise the voyage, and would hire a crew, who would be paid in
the same share or “lay” system used in all whaling voyages at the time. The corporations
thus simply grafted a much more diﬀuse pattern of ownership and a more formal governance
structure onto an enterprise organized in the typical fashion in most other respects.
But as these corporations sought to become owned as diﬀusely as possible, the agent
was not envisaged to be a major investor in the ﬁrm, and in fact usually held only a small
stake.32 At least in one case, the agent’s compensation came principally in the form of a
fee of 21
2% on all expenses—the purchase of vessels, supplies, etc.—which created strong
incentives for spending, rather than eﬀort.33 The agent’s role evolved into something like
that of a professional manager, whose incentives to perform his duties diligently and act
in the interest of the shareholders arose chieﬂy from the monitoring of the directors and
oﬃcers.34
The success of these ﬁrms depended critically on the strength of this governance struc-
ture, and its ability to create the appropriate incentives for management. This meant that
the directors needed to have been capable of monitoring and evaluating the performance of
the agent, and using their power to ﬁre and replace him if necessary. Rather than relying on
management’s stake in the ﬁrm to provide incentives, these corporations created an alter-
native incentive mechanism, an example of what Williamson (1985) has termed hierarchies.
After more than 100 years of deep-sea whaling from American ports, these corporations
32Data on individual shareholdings are scant, but in the Cold Spring Whaling Co., Portsmouth Whaling
Co., Fall River Whaling Co., and Wilmington Whaling Co., the agent owned shares equivalent to less than
5% of the ﬁrms. In comparison, Hilt (2003) documents that agents in some ports owned as much as 44% of
their ventures, on average. See also Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997).
33Ichabod Goodwin, agreement with the Portsmouth Whaling Co., 30 May 1832.
34See, for example, the “By-Laws of the Cold Spring Whaling Company,” in Cold Spring Whaling Co.
(1837-51).
11represented the ﬁrst attempt to organize and govern a whaling venture in this fashion.
Of the whaling corporations that were chartered in the 1830s and early 1840s, none
survived past the late 1840s. The American whaling industry continued to thrive until the
Civil War, and enjoyed some years of success in the postbellum period, but most whaling
corporations were unable to remain in business long enough to sponsor more than a few
voyages. The next section will attempt to determine the sources of the failure of these
corporations.
3 Determinants of the corporations’ failures
The heavy reliance on concentrated ownership throughout the history of the American
whaling industry suggests a need for powerful incentives that a corporation may not have
been capable of providing. However, there were many other forces, unrelated to incentive
problems, that undermined the success of the whaling corporations. The founders of whaling
corporations, for example, generally had little experience in whaling, and simply may not
have possessed the requisite knowledge or skills to succeed. Incompetence may have doomed
these ﬁrms, irrespective of their ownership structure.
The locations in which the corporations were founded suggest another possible explana-
tion for the failure of whaling corporations. 78 diﬀerent American ports sponsored at least
one whaling voyage, but the industry was dominated by a relatively small number that
specialized in whaling. Figure 1 plots the number of voyages from American ports from
1805-70, and illustrates the share of the ﬁve major whaling ports—Nantucket, New Bedford,
Fairhaven (MA); Sag Harbor (NY); and New London (CT)—which together accounted for
68% of whaling voyages during the period.35 If there were signiﬁcant agglomeration ex-
ternalities in the industry, for example in the form of better prices for supplies, or more
accurate information about the past success of potential captains or the location of whale
populations, then ﬁrms located outside these ports would suﬀer a natural disadvantage.
Table 1 presents a list of whaling corporations that were chartered before 1845, along
with their locations. In none of the ﬁve largest whaling ports of the 1820s were corporations
35Calculations from data in Starbuck (1878).
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Whaling Voyages from American Ports, 1805-70
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Note: “Major ports” includes Nantucket, New Bedford and Faihaven, MA; Sag Harbor,
NY; and New London, CT. Sources: Author’s calculations from Starbuck (1878).
formed. Instead, whaling corporations were founded in ports that were only marginal
participants in the industry.
Thus, whaling corporations were often founded by new entrants into the industry, lo-
cated in ports with little history of whaling activity, who may have been unable to ﬁnance
a whaling voyage (or succeed in the business) using the traditional organizational struc-
tures, and who obtained a charter to help raise money. Many of the corporations chartered
had diﬃculty attracting suﬃcient capital to commence operations—the charter of Dutchess
Whaling Co. was amended so that its founders could have additional time to raise the re-
quired $50,000 capital stock, and the charter of the Cold Spring Whaling Co. was amended
so that it could commence operations after only $40,000 had been paid in, rather than
the $50,000 initially required.36 Successful whaling entrepreneurs, who would have been
able to ﬁnance their investments through the cash ﬂows generated by their ﬁrms’ existing
operations, would have derived little beneﬁt from the features of corporate charters, unless
they wanted to obtain better access to capital by making their businesses more attractive
36“An Act to amend an act to incorporate the Dutchess whaling company,” April 11, 1834, and “An Act
to revive and amend an act to incorporate the Cold-spring whaling company,” April 28, 1840, in the New
York State Session Laws.
13Table 1:
Whaling Corporations
Name City State Incorporated
New York Whaling Co. Brooklyn NY 1831
Newburgh Whaling Co. Newburgh NY 1832
Portsmouth Pier Co. Portsmouth NH 1832
Portsmouth Whaling Co. Portsmouth NH 1832
Poughkeepsie Whaling Co. Poughkeepsie NY 1832
Dutchess Whaling Co. Poughkeepsie NY 1833
Hudson Whaling Co. Hudson NY 1833
Newark Whaling, Sealing & Mfg. Co. Newark NJ 1833
North River Whaling Co. Newburgh NY 1833
Wilmington Whaling Co. Wilmington DE 1833
Westchester Whaling Co. Peekskill NY 1834
Wiscasset Whale Fishing Co. Wiscasset ME 1834
Dorchester Whaling Co. Dorchester MA 1836
Fall River Whaling Co. Fall River MA 1836
Staten-Island Whaling Co. Port Richmond NY 1838
Cold Spring Whaling Co. Oyster Bay NY 1838
Duxbury Whaling Co. Duxbury MA 1841
Sources: State Session Laws of DE, MA, ME, NH, NJ, and NY, 1830-1845.
14to small investors.
Another potential source of the inferior performance of whaling corporations could be
that these enterprises pursued a diﬀerent approach or technique to whaling. At a minimum,
these corporations probably faced a diﬀerent cost of capital, which should have inﬂuenced
their investment decisions.37 But if their diﬀuse ownership structures eﬀectively insured
their owners and managers against the risks of their operations, their risk-taking decisions
may have been aﬀected. These factors may have resulted in voyages that were less produc-
tive in ex post measures of performance.
There are several potential explanations for the failure of whaling corporations. Unfor-
tunately, detailed ﬁnancial data on whaling ventures from this era are scant, meaning that
direct tests on the ﬁnancial performance of whaling corporations can not be conducted.
However, it is possible to measure from surviving records the productivity of the whaling
voyages, and therefore to compare the productivity of voyages sponsored by corporations
to those sponsored by unincorporated owners.38 Moreover, many voyage characteristics,
ranging from the size and age of the vessels employed, to the itinerary of the voyages and
the prior experience of the captain, can be obtained from surviving records, so that diﬀer-
ences in the types of voyages pursued, or inputs employed, can potentially be included as
controls in an empirical test. If a negative eﬀect of the corporate form on productivity can
be identiﬁed, then this would support the notion that corporations were unable to create
adequate incentive structures for their agents. In the next section, the dataset used to
conduct an empirical test, and the identiﬁcation strategy employed, are described.
37Whether this cost of capital was higher or lower than that of the unincorporated ventures is unclear.
On the one hand, in principle the small and presumably more diversiﬁable stakes held in corporations could
have led their owners to demand a lower rate of return. On the other hand, many of these corporations had
diﬃculty raising capital and attracting investors, suggesting that they faced binding constraints on their
access to capital.
38It should be noted that, to the extent that ﬁrms in smaller ports faced higher costs, the measure
of productivity presented below may understate the average diﬀerence in ﬁnancial performance between
corporate whaling ventures and their unincorporated counterparts.
154 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
In order to identify the eﬀects of organization as a corporation on the success, or productiv-
ity, of whaling voyages, a dataset of 874 voyages from 22 diﬀerent ports, from 1830-1849, was
assembled. A detailed account of the sample, and the sources employed, is presented in the
Data Appendix. In order to ensure that the sample contained as broad as possible a range
of whaling ﬁrms, data on agents from major whaling ports, including New London, New
Bedford, Fairhaven and Sag Harbor, as well as many diﬀerent minor ports were obtained.
The voyages in the sample were sponsored by 106 diﬀerent agents, and include those of 14
corporations.39 Except for the voyages from New Bedford, New London, and Sag Harbor,
where a 20% sample was taken, all voyages where data was available were included in the
sample. The 874 voyages in the dataset are equivalent to 19.5% of the total population of
whaling voyages initiated in the United States during the period.
The identities of the owners of each vessel, and the vessels’ characteristics (their age and
tonnage), were obtained from vessel registers.40 For many vessels owned by corporations,
the name of the corporation, rather than the name of each shareholder, was listed on the
register. However, in some cases, the names of all the shareholders were listed on on the
register; these names were compared to the names listed as founders in the charters of the
corporations to identify which corporation owned the vessel. The departure date, itinerary
(Atlantic, Paciﬁc, or Indian Ocean), arrival date, and proceeds (barrels of sperm oil and
whale oil, and pounds of baleen) were obtained from Starbuck (1878). Data on the identity
of the captain, his experience (measured as number of previous commands), and whether
he died during the voyage was obtained from Lund (2001).
In order to compare the success or productivities of the diﬀerent voyages, an index
3917 charters of incorporation were granted to whaling enterprises between 1830 and 1850; see Table 1. 3 of
these corporations were unable to raise the minimum paid-in capital required by their charters to commence
operations, and are therefore sponsored no voyages that could be included in the sample. See the Data
Appendix.
40After 1790, registers were required of all domestic vessels engaged in foreign trade. The register listed
the name of the captain, the vessel’s owners and their managing owner or agent, the dimensions and age of
the vessel and the place in which the vessel was built. Around 1850, these registers also began to record the
fraction each owner held in the vessel.
16of voyage productivity was constructed. This index measures the log of output produced
per unit of inputs. As these voyages returned with quantities of sperm oil, whale oil, and
baleen—that is, the oil of sperm whales, the oil of right whales and other similar whales, and
the ﬂexible keratinous material known as “whalebone”—these amounts (in gallons in the
case of oil, and in pounds for baleen) were summed, with the gallons of sperm oil and pounds
of baleen ﬁrst multiplied by their relative prices at the time of arrival.41 The quantities are
thus expressed in whale-oil-gallon-equivalent amounts. The denominator, the quantity of
inputs, is measured as the vessel tonnage multiplied by the number of months at sea, and
is thus expressed in ton-months.42 The productivity index is the log of this ratio, or:
Productivity = ln
µ
whale oil + (sperm oil £ rel: price) + (baleen £ rel: price)
tons £ months
¶
For 50 of the voyages in the sample, the vessel was lost or suﬃciently damaged to be
“condemned” in a foreign port, and did not return home. For 43 of those voyages, Starbuck
(1878) does not record how much, if any, of the output of the voyage had been produced
until the point where it was damaged, or how much was recovered and sent home. The
loss of these voyages was regarded as a separate event, and excluded from the productivity
regressions. However, a dummy variable equal to one for lost vessels was recorded.
Finally, the experience of each agent, measured as the number of voyages managed prior
to the sample period, was also recorded from Starbuck (1878), as was the total voyages
in each city from 1815-1829. For the corporations, if the agent (as identiﬁed on the vessel
register) had some experience prior to incorporating the ﬁrm, the number of voyages that
agent had sponsored is recorded as the prior experience of the corporation. Summary
statistics for each of the variables collected is presented in Table 2.
The characteristics of the voyages sponsored by corporations and by unincorporated
41Relative prices were obtained from Starbuck (1878).
42The limitation of this approach is that the quantity of labor input is not measured. Unfortunately, data
on the crews of voyages from small whaling ports is scant. Moreover, there was very high rates of desertion
from whaling voyages, which makes the quantity of labor observed at the vessels’ departures a poor measure
of total labor input. However, as the size of the crew varied with the size of the vessel—larger crews were
necessary to operate larger vessels—the data on vessel tonnage should serve as a reasonable proxy for total
inputs. Some veriﬁcation of this is provided below. In addition, an important indicator of the quality of
labor inputs, the level of experience of the captain, is included separately in the regressions below. For a
discussion of the determinants of crews on whaling voyages, see Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997).
17Table 2:
Descriptive Statistics
Name Deﬁnition N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Corporation Dummy = 1: vessel owned by corp. 874 0.09 – 0 1
Firm experience Voyages managed prior to sample 874 4.69 6.67 0 28
Port experience Voyages from port, 1815-29 874 177.14 185.03 0 418
Owners Number of owners of vessel 717 11.41 13.88 1 93
Vessel tons Vessel tons (size) 874 339.71 66.03 107 699
Vessel age Years since vessel was built 858 17.48 8.79 0 46
Captain’s experience Number of voyages as captain 860 1.58 1.85 0 13
Paciﬁc Dummy = 1: voyage to Paciﬁc 874 0.56 – 0 1
Indian Dummy = 1: voyage to Indian 874 0.19 – 0 1
Atlantic Dummy = 1: voyage to Atlantic 874 0.25 – 0 1
Specialization in sperm Dummy = 1: voyage specialized 831 0.31 – 0 1
Voyage Length Months of voyage 832 28.23 11.37 4 57
Productivity Voyage productivity index 831 2.50 0.44 1.07 4.21
Vessel lost Dummy = 1: vessel didn’t return 874 0.06 – 0 1
Captain died Dummy=1: captain died 861 0.02 – 0 1
Crewmembers/ton Crewmembers/vessel tons 376 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.17
18Table 3:
Firm and Voyage Characteristics: Corporations vs. Others
Means:
Corporations Unincorporated Ventures P > jtj
Firm Characteristics
Firm experience (voys.) 0.50 2.89 0.08
Port experience (voys.) 0.57 167.08 0.00
Voyage Characteristics
Number of owners 40.98 8.95 0.00
Vessel tons 329.74 340.73 0.15
Vessel age 13.87 17.83 0.00
Captain’s experience (voys.) 1.21 1.62 0.06
Paciﬁc ocean 0.59 0.55 0.55
Indian ocean 0.21 0.19 0.65
Specialization in Sperm oil 0.31 0.31 0.94
Voyage length (mos.) 29.62 28.09 0.26
Crewmembers/ton 0.08 0.08 0.96
Note: P > jtj denotes the signiﬁcance level of a two-sided test of diﬀerences in means. The
statistics in the ﬁrst panel, ﬁrm characteristics, are calculated as the unweighted means of
the diﬀerent ﬁrms in the sample. For the corporations, ﬁrm experience is calculated as the
number of voyages managed by the founders of the corporation. In the second panel, voyages,
all of the variables except voyage length, vessel age, and crewmembers per ton, are available
for all 874 observations. For voyage length, vessel age, and crewmembers per ton, this is
available for 832, 858, and 376 observations, respectively.
partnerships are compared in Table 3, which also includes the signiﬁcance level of a two-
sided t-test. As one might expect, the characteristic for which the corporations and the other
ventures diﬀer most substantially is their average number of owners: 41 for corporations,
compared to 9 for partnerships. The corporations were also located in ports with far less
experience in whaling prior to the sample period, and founded by entrepreneurs who were
less experienced than the partnerships’ agents.
However, in many respects the choices that the corporations made for their voyages were
not so diﬀerent from those of the partnerships. They used vessels of approximately the same
size, and roughly similar ages; they sent their vessels to the Atlantic and Paciﬁc Oceans with
19Table 4:
Productivity: Corporations vs. Others
Means:
Corporations Unincorporated Ventures P > jtj
Vessel idle btwn. voyages (mos.) 4.05 3.92 0.72
Voyage productivity index 2.23 2.53 0.00
Standard dev., productivity 0.49 0.42 0.06
Vessel lost 0.09 0.05 0.24
Note: P > jtj denotes the signiﬁcance level of a two-sided test of diﬀerences in means. The
number given for diﬀerences in the standard deviations of productivity, however, is the signiﬁcance
level for a two-sided F (variance ratio) test. Vessel idle between voyages is deﬁned as the
number of months between successive voyages of the same vessel, and is computed for the 453 such
voyages in the sample. The voyage productivity index is available for 831 voyages.
roughly the same frequency as the partnerships; they managed voyages that specialized in
obtaining the oil of sperm whales about as often as their counterparts did; and the average
length of their voyages was just slightly longer. This is important because it suggests that
any diﬀerences in the productivity among the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms were unlikely to be
due to diﬀerences in methods or approach, at least across these observable dimensions. At
a minimum, this suggests that the whaling voyages sponsored by corporations were not
diﬀerent from those sponsored by partnerships in any fundamental way.
Two other features of the data are worth noting: perhaps because they were based in
ports with less whaling activity, the corporations hired captains who had somewhat less
experience, measured as the number of voyages on which the captain had previously been
master. The diﬀerence (1.2 vs. 1.6 voyages) is nearly statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, and suggests that an analysis of voyage productivity should control for the captain’s
experience.
Secondly, the number of crewmembers per vessel ton is the same in both groups. This
is critical, because it implies that there are no systematic diﬀerences in the relationship
between crew size and vessel size, between the corporations and the unincorporated ven-
tures. This implies that the the vessel tonnage—as used in the productivity index described
above—is a reasonable measure of the quantity of inputs employed on the voyages.
20Table 4 presents measures of productivity for the voyages in the sample. The ﬁrst
measure presented, the number of months a vessel sits idle between voyages, is a general
indication of the eﬃciency with which the ﬁrms made use of their capital. Although the
corporations tended to take somewhat longer to reﬁt their vessels and send them back out
to sea, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the delay might simply be
the result of the fact that the corporations tended to be located in obscure ports, where
supplies were somewhat more diﬃcult to obtain.
The second and third rows of the table present the means and standard deviations of
the voyage productivity index. The voyages sponsored by corporations were signiﬁcantly
less productive than those managed by partnerships. This is a much clearer indication
that the performance of whaling voyages was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than that of the voyages
sponsored by partnerships. The standard deviation of this measure is only slightly higher
for the corporations, suggesting that (at least ex post) it does not appear to be the case that
their managers undertook riskier voyages. The higher rate at which corporate vessels were
lost (9% vs. 5%), however, could be an indication of this, although it could also simply be
an indication of poor performance or management.
These tabulations suggest that the voyages sponsored by corporations were very similar
to those sponsored by partnerships, except that they were less productive. One must
be careful not to infer a causal relationship from these results—the corporations do not
represent a randomly-assigned treatment group, after all. The next section presents an
analysis of voyage productivity in an individual-ﬁxed-eﬀects framework, in order to try to
identify a causal eﬀect, or at least rule out the possibility that the productivity diﬀerence
observed are due purely to selection.
4.2 Estimation Results
The 874 voyages in the dataset are organized as a panel, with the groups being the 106
diﬀerent agents that sponsored the voyages. Many of the corporations in the dataset were
founded and managed by agents who had some prior experience in whaling, and/or would
have subsequent experience in whaling after the corporation was dissolved. Comparing the
productivity in the voyages managed by these agents in corporations and in partnerships
21can therefore be used as a source of identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the corporate structure,
in an individual-ﬁxed-eﬀect framework. The dataset contains 91 voyages sponsored by such
agents, and the eﬀect of the corporate form will be identiﬁed from these observations.
The eﬀect of organizational form on productivity will be estimated in the context of a
simple empirical model of the determinants of the productivity of voyages. For the voyage
of agent i in year t, the model is as follows:
yit = ®i + ±t + °corpit + xit¯ + uit;
where ®i is an agent ﬁxed eﬀect, ±t is a year eﬀect, corpit is a binary variable for the corporate
form of organization, and xit is a vector of voyage characteristics. The hypothesized sign
of °, the coeﬃcient on the corporation variable, is negative.
The voyage characteristics in the regression include data on the vessels, the captain, and
the itinerary of the voyage. In their careful study of the determinants of productivity of
New Bedford whaling voyages, Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997) that there were (mildly)
decreasing returns to scale in the industry; larger vessels should therefore be somewhat less
productive on a per-ton basis. Therefore the tonnage of the vessels will be included, as will
the age of the vessels. Only very coarse measures of the “cruising grounds” to which the
voyages were sent is available; the ocean listed as the primary destination of the voyage will
also be included in the regression.
The role of the captain at sea was critical in the prosecution of the voyage, and the
captain’s performance of his role was certainly an important determinant of the success of
the voyage. The measure of the captain’s experience will therefore be included, as it may
help control for the quality of the captain commanding the vessel. On about 2% of the
voyages in the sample, the captain died during the voyage, usually due to injuries sustained
on board the vessel, but sometimes due to disease. When this occurred, the captain would
usually have been replaced by one of the mates, leaving the vessel with one fewer oﬃcer,
and this would have impacted the productivity of the crew. But in addition, in response to
the death of the captain, the mates would sometimes bring the vessel into port and attempt
22to contact the agent to decide how to proceed, disrupting the progress of the voyage.43
Therefore, a dummy variable measuring whether the captain died during the voyage will
also be included.
Davis, Gallman and Gleiter document that hunting pressure—the quantity of vessels
on the oceans pursuing whales—had a negative eﬀect on productivity, and these forces,
combined with declining quality of the crews hired in whaling, caused productivity to decline
over the period covered by the sample. The year ﬁxed eﬀects included in each speciﬁcation
should capture the eﬀects of these (and related) inﬂuences on productivity over time.
The results are reported in Table 5. Column (1) reports the results when only the corpo-
ration variable is included, along with the ﬁxed eﬀect for the individual agents, and for the
years. The estimated coeﬃcient is negative and highly signiﬁcant, and approximately equal
to 90% of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. This is a strong indication that
the voyages of corporations were less productive than those of unincorporated enterprises,
and this can not be attributed to selection.
In column (2), the characteristics of the vessels and the captains, and the voyage
itineraries, are included as covariates.44 As expected, the size of the vessel has a negative
eﬀect on productivity, as does the vessel’s age (although the latter eﬀect is not statistically
distinguishable from zero.) The ocean to which the vessel was sent also had an important
eﬀect on productivity; voyages sent to the Paciﬁc were less productive, relative to those sent
the excluded (Indian) ocean. The productivity of voyages sent to the Atlantic, however,
was essentially no diﬀerent from that of the Indian. The captain’s experience increases
productivity, although again the estimate is quite imprecise.45
As expected, the eﬀect of the death of the captain is large and highly signiﬁcant. It
should therefore be noted that the eﬀect of organization as a corporation, even with the
various vessel and voyage characteristics included as controls, is actually larger than the
eﬀect of the death of the captain (-.36 vs. -.34).
43Some examples of this are mentioned in Starbuck (1878).
44The data on the age of the vessel is missing for 22 voyages in the sample. In many cases, this is due
to the fact that the vessel entered the ﬂeet as a prize vessel—a vessel captured from a foreign power by a
privateer. For these vessels, the date it was constructed was not known or recorded in the registers.
45In general, the eﬀects of the voyage itinerary and vessel characteristics are consistent with those found
by Davis, Gallman and Gleiter (1997).
23Table 5:
Voyage Productivity Regressions
The Dependent Variable is the Index of Voyage Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporation -0.402** -0.356** -0.259*
(0.153) (0.094) (0.126)





Atlantic 0.048 0.076 0.071
(0.051) (0.048) (0.051)
Paciﬁc -0.108** -0.100* -0.102**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Vessel tons -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vessel age -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Captain’s experience 0.006 0.008 0.008
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Captain died -0.337** -0.411** -0.403**
(0.082) (0.113) (0.110)
Constant 2.989** 3.346** 3.354** 3.339**
(0.116) (0.131) (0.118) (0.118)
Year Eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Agent Eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Observations 831 809 671 671
Note: Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on ports, in parentheses. ** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 1% level; * denotes signiﬁcance at 5%.
24Is the large negative eﬀect of the corporate form on productivity due to weak incentives,
or other forces? One way to look for evidence corroborating the importance of incentives
is to examine the eﬀects of ownership structure on productivity throughout the sample.
Among the voyages sponsored by agents who were never involved in corporations, there was
substantial variation in the number of owners of the vessels. Some unincorporated voyages
had large numbers of owners, and in some ways even attempted to become somewhat more
corporate-like in their emphasis on small shareholders.46 If the productivity of these voyages
was lower than that of the voyages with fewer owners (again, in the context of a model with
agent ﬁxed eﬀects), this would be consistent with the ﬁnding of the importance of weak
incentives for productivity in whaling corporations. Diﬀuse ownership should diminish the
incentives of individual shareholders to monitor the agent.
Column (3) in Table 5 presents estimates for a speciﬁcation similar to the one presented
in column (2), only it includes the the number of owners of each vessel (divided by 10), and
a quadratic term in this number, in lieu of the variable for corporations. The estimated
eﬀect of the number of owners is negative and substantial. The coeﬃcients imply that, at
the mean, a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of owners reduced the value of
the voyage productivity index by 0.140, the equivalent of 32% of a standard deviation of
the dependent variable.
This raises the question of whether the eﬀects of the corporate form arise from the large
number of shareholders in corporations, or whether there other features of the corporations
form that aﬀected productivity. Column (4) presents an attempt to address this question,
by including both the corporation variable, and the variables measuring the number of
owners, in the same speciﬁcation. With both ownership variables included, the eﬀect of
the corporation variable becomes smaller but remains signiﬁcant, while the variable for
the number of owners also becomes smaller. This is at least consistent with the notion
that corporations had some eﬀects on productivity independent of the diﬀuse ownership
structures they created. The fact that the agents themselves tended to hold small stakes,
for example, may have played a role in diminishing productivity, independently of the fact
46Several merchants in the port of Sag Harbor, for example, managed whaling “companies” with relatively
large number of owners and some corporate-like features. See Tiﬀany (1840-48).
25that there were few other large shareholders within the same ventures.
Are these eﬀects plausible? Could the eﬀorts of the manager make such a diﬀerence?
One response is to note that in their careful study of whaling agents in New Bedford, Davis,
Gallman and Gleiter (1997) ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in the average productivity of the
diﬀerent agents. This implies that the eﬀorts of the agents were important determinants
of voyage productivity, and anything that reduced the incentives of the agents to perform
their roles diligently might have a substantial eﬀect on the outcome of the voyages.
Some further evidence suggestive of diminished incentives in corporations is found in the
behavior of one corporation’s agent, whose letter book survives. Rather than identifying
and hiring a captain and crew himself, as would normally have been the case for whaling
agents, this agent wrote to a friend in New Bedford and asked him to hire an agent for his
vessel. For another voyage he agent delegated all authority to the captain for hiring the
crew, and negotiating their wage contracts.47 Certainly this agent exerted less eﬀort in the
process of hiring the captain and crew than his counterparts in unincorporated ventures
normally would have.
In the next section, the robustness of the ﬁndings is examined in more detail.
4.3 Robustness of the Results
The results presented in Table 5 identiﬁed a strong negative eﬀect on productivity of the
corporate form within the voyages managed by agents who were involved in both partner-
ships and corporations. The results can refute the notion that the poor performance of
corporations was due purely to selection.
However, there are other reasons to question whether a causal relationship has been
identiﬁed. There is the possibility, for example, that agents whose productivity was declining
joined corporations, as this provided a way for them to reduce their exposure to their
voyages’ returns. If this were the case, then the lower productivity observed in corporations
would not be caused by the corporate form, but would simply be due to the fact that after
the agent joined a corporation, his productivity continued to decline due to other forces. In
47Ichabod Goodwin, agent of the Portsmouth Whaling Co., letter to Charles Whitredge (24 January 1836),
and letter to captain Charles Barnard (14 July 1832).
26Table 6:
Voyage Productivity Regressions
The Dependent Variable is the Index of Voyage Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporation -0.379* -0.352** -0.340** -0.316**
(0.170) (0.112) (0.104) (0.063)
Agent Eﬀ. & Agent-Speciﬁc Trend yes yes yes no
Agent-Speciﬁc Quadratic Trend no no yes no
Port Eﬀects & Port-Speciﬁc Trend no no no yes
Observations 831 809 809 809
Note: Column (1) reports only the estimated coeﬃcient on the corporation variable from
the same speciﬁcation as column (1) in Table 5, with the addition of an individual-speciﬁc
trend. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for the same speciﬁcation as column (2) in
Table 5, with the addition of individual-speciﬁc trend, an individual-speciﬁc quadratic
trend, respectively. Column (4) reports the results for the same speciﬁcation as column
(2) in Table 5, with port ﬁxed eﬀects and port-speciﬁc trends, rather than individual
eﬀects. All speciﬁcations include time eﬀects. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on
ports, reported in parentheses. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level; * denotes signi-
ﬁcance at 5%.
order to address this possibility, some of the regressions in Table 5 were re-estimated with
agent-speciﬁc time trends included as well. That is, the model presented above would be
modiﬁed, to become,
yit = ®i + ±it + ±t + °corpit + xit¯ + uit;
where ±it is the agent-speciﬁc trend. These time trends should control for such changes over
time in the productivity of the agents.
Table 6 presents the results of these speciﬁcations. (The table reports only the estimated
coeﬃcient on the corporation variable, and omits all the others.) Columns (1) and (2) report
the estimates from the same equations as columns (1) and (2) in Table 5, respectively, only
with the addition of agent-speciﬁc time trends. Column (3) in Table 6 considers the more
complicated possibility of nonlinear time trends in the agents’ productivities, by estimating
the same equation as column (2) in Table 5, with the addition of linear and quadratic agent-
speciﬁc trends. None of the results are meaningfully diﬀerent from those reported in Table
27Table 7:
Corporations vs. Unincorporated Ventures
(Agents Observed in Both)
Means:
Corporations Unincorporated Ventures P > jtj
Vessel age 15.72 15.94 0.91
Vessel tons 335.30 354.53 0.33
Captain’s experience (voys.) 0.95 1.28 0.28
Paciﬁc ocean 0.67 0.58 0.41
Indian ocean 0.16 0.14 0.77
Specialization in sperm oil 0.21 0.19 0.87
Voyage length 28.95 21.24 0.06
Vessel idle btwn. voyages (mos.) 4.00 3.95 0.92
Voyage productivity index 2.10 2.52 0.00
Standard dev., productivity 0.48 0.51 0.75
Note: P > jtj denotes the signiﬁcance level of a two-sided test of diﬀerences in means. The
number given for diﬀerences in the standard deviations of productivity, however, is the signiﬁcance
level for a two-sided F (variance ratio) test. Vessel idle between voyages is deﬁned as the
number of months between successive voyages of the same vessel, and is computed for the 453 such
voyages in the sample. The voyage productivity index is available for 831 voyages.
5. The issue of agents selecting into corporations in anticipation of poor performance, at
least as far as it can be captured by agent-speciﬁc trends, does not seem to have played a
role in the productivity diﬀerences documented above.
A further check of the robustness of the results is to use ﬁxed eﬀects for the ports in
the sample, rather than the agents, thus comparing the corporate-managed voyages to the
unincorporated ventures within the same ports. If the observed eﬀect were substantially
diﬀerent, this might suggest that the agents who formed corporations were somehow un-
representative of the agents from the same port. Estimates for a speciﬁcation that includes
port eﬀects and port-speciﬁc trends are presented in column (4) of Table 5, and the eﬀect
is quite similar.
Finally, Table 7 compares the characteristics of the 91 voyages managed by the agents
28observed in both corporations and partnerships, in order to examine whether the agents
managed these voyages in a way that diﬀered somehow (and may have inﬂuenced productiv-
ity.) There are a few diﬀerences in their voyages—they hired captains with somewhat less
experience, they sent vessels to the Paciﬁc with slightly greater frequency, and, of course,
the voyage productivity was lower. In addition, their corporate voyages were much longer.
It is likely that this is due to the lower productivity of these voyages (meaning that the
captain chose to remain at sea in order to obtain a reasonable catch.)
In most other respects, the voyages are very similar. In particular, the standard devia-
tions of the voyages’ productivities are quite similar, so this ex post measure of risk taking
does not seem to indicate any diﬀerence between organizational types. It does not appear
to be the case, for example, that these agents took greater risks in their voyages when they
were within corporations.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In the 1830s, the corporate form began to ﬁnd widespread use among businesses in the
United States, and some of the entrepreneurs who obtained charters did so to create whaling
corporations. Whaling was a thriving American industry in this period, and was dominated
by closely-held enterprises in a small number of specialized ports. The new whaling corpo-
rations faced many disadvantages—they were located in obscure ports, and were founded
by individuals with relatively little experience in the business.
This paper has shown, however, that there was another important obstacle to these ven-
tures’ success: the corporate form itself. The empirical analysis compared the productivity
of whaling voyages sponsored by the same managers within corporations, and within un-
incorporated ventures, and found that these managers’ voyages were less productive when
they were employed by corporations. Thus the estimated eﬀect is not due to the obscure
ports in which the corporations were located—the managers’ various voyages were all based
in the same ports—or the lack of talent or experience of the manager. The diﬀuse owner-
ship structure of the corporations, and the reduced stakes held by their managers, likely
diminished the incentives for the managers to perform their roles diligently.
29The analysis of this paper has shown that the problems identiﬁed by Berle and Means
(1932) in the large ﬁrms of the 1930s were likely to have been endemic in much earlier
corporations as well. About 100 years before the publication of their study, the ﬁrst whal-
ing voyages sponsored by an American corporation were launched. The corporations that
sponsored these voyages represented a signiﬁcant departure from the usual mode of orga-
nization of whaling ventures. These corporations were diﬀusely owned, and were run by
agents whose role began to resemble that of professional managers. Whaling was a business
where consistent success was very diﬃcult to achieve, and the weaker incentives produced
by these corporations at least contributed to their poor performance. Perhaps because of
their organizational forms, these enterprises proved themselves to be “nothing but land
lubbers.”48
48Wilmington Gazette, 6 May 1834.
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33Data Appendix
Whaling corporations were identiﬁed by searching the session laws of the states of Delaware,
New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Maine, and examining all of the corporate charters that were granted as special acts of the
legislatures. Of the 17 corporations listed in Table 1, 14 were able to raise the paid-in capital
required by their charters to commence operations. Each of these corporations’ voyages are
included in the sample. The three that were never able to commence operations were the
New York Whaling Co., North River Whaling Co., and Westchester Whaling Co.
The dataset contains 874 voyages initiated in 22 diﬀerent American ports. These include
Salem, Dorchester, Fall River, Fairhaven, Duxbury, and New Bedford, Massachusetts; New-
port, Bristol, Warren and Providence, Rhode Island; Sag Harbor, Poughkeepsie, Newburgh,
Hudson, Port Richmond, and Oyster Bay, New York; Wiscasset and Portland, Maine; and
Newark, New Jersey; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Wilmington, Delaware, and New Lon-
don, Connecticut. 4 of the 5 major whaling ports—New Bedford, Fairhaven, Sag Harbor,
and New London—are included in the sample. (Nantucket is excluded because very few
registers for Nantucket vessels are in the possession of the National Archives.) The ports
included in the sample were the ports from which the best records are available. In its dis-
tribution of major and minor ports, the sample is generally representative of the population:
68% of the voyages in the sample are from major ports (vs. 66% of the population for the
sample period), and 32% of the voyages are from minor ports (vs. 34% of the population.)
Population statistics were computed from data contained in Starbuck (1878).
Vessel registers were used to identify the agent or ﬁrm managing each whaling voyage,
and also for the vessels’ tonnage and age, and the number of owners. (A description of the
purpose and content of vessel registers is found in Stein, 1992.) For the voyages originating
in the states of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Maine,
these registers were found at the National Archives, Washington D.C. (Records of the Bu-
reau of Marine Inspection and Navigation—Group 41). For the vessels originating from
the ports of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the compilations of vessel registers produced
by the Survey of Federal Archives of the Works Progress Administration were used. These
volumes included: Ship Registers and Enrollments of Dighton-Fall River, Massachusetts
1789-1938 (1939), Ship Registers of New Bedford, Massachusetts, 1796-1850 (1940), Ship
Registers and Enrollments of Bristol-Warren, Rhode Island, 1773-1939 (1941), Ship Reg-
isters and Enrollments of Providence, Rhode Island, 1773-1939 (1941), and Ship Registers
and Enrollments of Boston and Charlestown (1942). For the vessels originating from Salem,
Massachusetts, the source used was Hitchings and Phillips, Ship registers of the district of
Salem and Beverly, Massachusetts, 1789-1900, Salem: Essex Institute (1906).
Usually, the registers of vessels owned by corporations listed the name of the corporation
as the owner on the register. However, in some cases, the names of all the shareholders
were listed on on the register; these names were compared to the names listed as founders
in the charters of the corporations to identify whether a corporation owned the vessel. In
cases where the individual shareholders were not listed on the vessel registers, the names
of the shareholders (used to compute the number of owners) were obtained from stock
certiﬁcates or stock transfer ledgers. These included: the Cold Spring Whaling Co. “Ledger
of Stockholders;” the Portsmouth Whaling Co. stock certiﬁcates, the Fall River Whaling
Co. “Stock Transfer Ledger,” and the Wilmington Whaling Co. “Stock Ledger.” Few vessel
registers survive for the port of Sag Harbor. The vessel characteristics and the identity of
34the managing agent of each vessel was obtained from the manuscript “List of Shipping
Owned in Sag Harbor in 1839” in the John Jermain Library, Sag Harbor NY.
The number of crewmembers on board the vessel at its departure was obtained for
vessels originating in the ports of Hudson, Poughkeepsie, and Newburgh, NY; New London,
CT; Newport, RI; and Salem, Fall River, Fairhaven, and New Bedford, MA. For the ports
in New York, these were taken from the crew lists of vessels from the port of New York,
in the National Archives, New York (Records of the Customs Service—Group 36). For the
ports in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, these were taken from the crew
lists of the various ports in the National Archives, Boston. (A description of the purpose
and content of oﬃcial crew lists is found in Stein, 1992.)
The departure and arrival dates of the voyages, the number of barrels of whale oil and
sperm oil taken, the dummy variable for whether the vessel was lost, the voyage itineraries,
and the characteristics of the diﬀerent ports were all compiled from Starbuck (1878).
Data on the identity of the captain, his experience, and whether he died during the
voyage was obtained from Lund (2001).
35